Critiquing the Travel Technology Ecosystem

Aligning business operational models with ecological terms has become a popular pastime, especially in technology. Almost 20 years ago, Harvard academic James F. Moore developed the idea in his business strategy book, The Death of Competition.i

Refinements and corrections continue to the present day, but some of his fundamental premises have become part of the business landscape. The travel industry is no exception–albeit most people espousing the concept deviate significantly from the standard definitions and describe the ecosystem to meet their unique business objectives.

Travel Ecosystem 20140626.GIFEssentially, the basic theories say that businesses can best succeed when they consider their business environment, and not just their competition, or even meeting the needs of their customers. Various businesses and their services can contribute not only to delivering products and services that customers find valuable, but also toward making the business environment positive.

These disparate entities are often themselves suppliers and customers of each other, and hence form part of the ecosystem in multiple ways. Moore suggests that enlightened companies will enhance the ecosystem by creating mutually beneficial relationships not only with customers and suppliers but also with their competitors.

The accompanying graphic shows a simplified view of how the major components of the travel management process conceptually work together and reinforce both each other and the business environment.ii

Moore’s book also says that there is something called an “ecosystem leader,” which is a company that creates a shared vision that others can use to, for instance, align their investments. Much of the book is devoted to examples of how this sort of leadership has occurred.

Business Leadership Examined


The travel industry has never been in want of companies anxious to lead the ecosystem–almost always in directions and ways that they created and find beneficial. This is not a new idea, nor did it originate with Moore–much of whose work the travel industry amends so as to be unrecognizable.

Forty years ago a few large airlines with technology assets began projects that became CRS and later GDS. These represented the most tightly integrated ecosystems the industry has ever seen.

They were managed along the business strategies their owners desired to pursue, and they carried the industry to new levels of productivity that would not have been otherwise possible. Collectively, most of the CRS/GDS industry was also part of a larger ecosystem lead by IBM–which provided the tools that made them work.iii

The leadership position of the GDS has collapsed over the last 15 years, which most observers conclude was probably positive. Yet, some of our industry colleagues advocate assembling new ecosystems, of course organized around new leaders, as the best way to ensure innovation and proper attention to customer priorities.

Are they right? What can we learn from prior experiences in an industry organized in this way?

Ideas Aren’t Real


I’ve wondered why business ecosystems are such popular discussion points. Once you understand how they are supposed to work, and put the business school jargon aside, most examples are seriously flawed.

Ideas aren’t real, in that they are abstractions of how people think things should work, not how the do work. A few lessons from experience are in order:

  1. No one can guarantee that the vision held by the ecosystem leader is correct, or that the leader executes it properly. More often, that vision is deficient and in pursuing it, the ecosystem leader and its followers succeed in repressing competition and innovation.
  2. Remember, while the early advances of CRS/GDS brought undeniable benefits, innovation quickly became difficult, and usually grudging, especially elsewhere within the ecosystem. It encouraged that type of behavior and it was not until it partly collapsed that the broad product and service industry innovation we see today became practical.
  3. Most examples of ecosystem leaders and supporting business systems impose costs on the participants that would not otherwise be there. This is particularly true in the travel industry, where suppliers have complained about the costs of the GDS ecosystem for decades.iv
  4. Not all participants in ecosystems add value In travel, some companies that are assumed participants in fact detract from the value realized by other businesses and consumers.
  5. It is unnatural for a tightly-controlled business ecosystem to encourage the type of broad, aggressive competition that focuses on meeting customer needs, eliminating unnecessary costs, and by-passing non-contributors. The symbiotic business relationships ecosystems envision tend to perpetuate channels, intermediaries, and processes that competition would discard.
  6. Ecosystem abuses are frequent. Leaders inhibit or reject inconvenient innovations and competitors in favor of perpetuating the ecosystem they control.


Ecosystems Aren’t the Same As Progress


Despite the fairly infrequent examples of where ecosystems have benefited industries and their participants, the reverse is more common and more compelling: there are almost no commercially successful desktop operating systems apart from Windows because the Microsoft ecosystem is successful, not because Windows is better. Almost all TMCs use a GDS in some form, despite its limitations and costs to suppliers, not because there are no other ways to make reservations (many have been proposed) but because the remnants of the GDS ecosystem are with us still.

Travel management and technology needs more innovation, aggressive competition, and precise focus on real customer needs, not the artifices and limitations imposed by more business ecosystems. There are costs imposed by pursuing all of these things, but leader-based business ecosystems have never proven themselves to be cheaper or faster short-cuts, or effective hedges against inevitable business mistakes.

Notes:

i The Death of Competition: Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems, HarperBusiness, 1996, ISBN 0-88730-850-3.

ii This example is simplified to illustrate the concept and is not designed to be comprehensive. Contemporary illustrations of the travel ecosystem would be much more complicated and include lines of business with sometimes dubious contributions.

iii The extent to which IBM influenced the technological direction of the travel industry has never been fully appreciated.

iv There are other industry examples; this is just the most obvious and compelling.

Questions About the GSA’s Travel Data Challenge

On February 19, 2014 the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) announced whatThe Beat calls a “first of its kind” competition to develop travel data analysis technology. The formal announcement posted by the GSA says:

“In this GSA Travel Data Challenge, the public is asked to develop a technology-driven solution using GSA travel data that allows an agency to identify opportunities to reduce costs.  As such, GSA challenges the public to create a tool using GSA travel data that could be replicated across government to every agency, using their own travel data.”

This exercise is described as “crowdsourcing” in other publications that usually pay little attention to how the GSA administers its travel programs or analyzes travel data–one supposes because the novelty of the approach somehow makes it important.

The Travel Data Challenge raises a number of questions that are equally worthy of some attention. Here are some of the most obvious:

  1. The competition offers $35,000 for a winning submission; lesser amounts to other categories totally $90,000 in all. This is but a fraction of what such a solution would likely earn in the open market, which makes one wonder why any established developer would want to participate.
  2.  

    Participants grant the government a perpetual, royalty-free license to any and all intellectual property comprising the winning entry. A good deal for government, but a bad deal for a truly innovative developer. While the terms of the contest go on to say that “All other rights of the winning entrant will be retained by the winner of the competition,” since the rules also say that “The final tool should be in Open Source Code,” we are left to ponder how little those remaining rights might be worth.

  3. The GSA has existing contracts-holders for a variety of travel management and analysis products. Why isn’t the innovation and creativity the agency desires forthcoming from these presumably well-funded and well-compensated sources? Perhaps the agency should be questioning whether its procurement and program management practices are truly adequate to deliver the sustained innovation it seeks, or if that is not the problem, then whether the incumbent vendors are up to the job?
  4. The Organization and operation of the event give the impression that many aspiring participants are unprepared for the task. Travel data analysis and interpretation is a complex and highly specialized field. The agency has provided only the sketch of what it wants to accomplish, and many of the online questions posted on the event site indicate that an understanding of the sources, tools, and objectives of successful travel management are equally barren within the community of interest developers. A much more thorough developer briefing is needed if all sides of the contest are to avoid wasting their time.

 

Why Not The Computer Business?

This analysis appeared February 24, 2014 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section.


Travel and technology are very different businesses. While technology supports and enhances much of the travel and transportation industry, difficulties begin when the two are confused.

You need competent people to help you address technological challenges, but you don’t need to be in the computer business. There are enough products and services on offer now, too many developers who don’t know what they’re doing, and too much imprecision hiding behind innovation.

Because technology is an important part of travel distribution, it’s easy to be overtaken by the sights, sounds, and outright glamour of technology. In recent years it’s become much easier (though by no means simple) to find investors for technology companies.

We’re used to hearing about technology start-ups with modest resources and still more modest ideas, to the point that people start to believe they should be part of the fun.

The Essential Differences

Succeeding as a technology developer is difficult, time-consuming, risky, and costly. While the marketplace makes room for genuinely good ideas, finding them is almost always harder than building them.

I read a recent contribution from a travel technology developer who suggested a few strategies for starting a travel technology venture. Among these were “doing the opposite of what already works,” and “recycling old ideas.” i

There’s a certain logical flaw in basing development projects on practices that, by definition, don’t work. The notion of having a genuinely good and innovative idea is something that entrepreneurs frequently neglect along the way.

Nor is it more than a remote possibility that most technology start-ups will succeed. It’s true that some start-ups pay big rewards to a few early investors and employees, but most simply spend their early capital without delivering more than the most trivial results and products.

There is a significant difference between having what seems to be a good idea and transforming that idea into a commercially practical product or service. Most travel technology products, web sites, and related gadgets accomplish very little and quickly fail the consumer’s “why should I care” test.

Although this may seem to be a heretical view, most travel technology is neither good nor useful–never has been. Apart from the handful of start-ups who are struck by the lightening of unanticipated success, most travel distribution success stories are told by people who had the rare talent of discerning between what works and what doesn’t.

Travel is a service business and successful participants in the industry must never lose sight of their customers and what they really want to buy. Understanding and correctly answering that question usually means the difference between success and failure–and is the essence of delivering customer service.

Travel customers, as an example, want to take vacations, do business in distant cities, visit their families, and a variety of other things. They don’t want someone to give them data, collect their data to give to someone else, or offer them pointless Amazon-like product suggestions because of past purchases that are no longer relevant.

I’ve frequently observed that almost nobody in travel distribution delivers customer service, or is able to do so. ii We’re so obsessed with recycling old ideas and focused on what our customers have bought that we can’t discern what they will buy, and therefore act accordingly.

Suggestions

Here are my own ideas for you to consider as you look for ways to employ technology as a business tool in travel distribution, and profit from it. They may sound simple, but effectively putting them into practice is sufficiently challenging to assure their competitive merit.

1)  Become The Best User Of Other People’s Tools

Skilled travel industry managers decide what their business goals are, how technology can help them reach those goals, and what partners have the requisite expertise to make that happen. They then move forward with those partners and don’t let themselves be distracted by short-term events and new but irrelevant ideas.

I’ve been CIO of multinational travel and transportation companies more than once. It was always a challenge to convince other parts of management that being the best user of tools that other people build can be as much, and often more, of a competitive advantage than was our own technology.

We want to believe that access to proprietary technology in itself creates an advantage, while we overlook the expense and risk creating that technology imposes and assume that we can succeed at maintaining and enhancing it.

In most instances using technology and what it provides well is more important than proprietary tools. Your competitors are usually not good technology managers, and you can exploit opportunities when they assume technology risks that you don’t have to.

2)  The Best Tool Is No Tool

Technology is attractive and we are conditioned to believe that the solutions it delivers work better, last longer, and are more efficient than answers we find elsewhere.

The secret here that takes experience and insight to understand is that many problems “solved” through technology were really unresolved management problems that could have been cured more efficiently in other ways–or the problems never existed in the first place.

Look for business opportunities and solutions that don’t depend upon new technology developments and you’re ahead of your more development-inclined competitors.

3)  Seek Scarcity, Then Exploit It

Forget recycling old ideas. If you’re looking for technology-driven opportunities, you’ll find them where people have demonstrable business needs that are not addressed in other ways.

These are difficult to find and still harder to develop, but unless you’re counting on that bolt of lightning, they are the only reliable path to successful products.

There’s plenty of scarcity, in ideas, management, products, and customer service throughout travel distribution to provide more than enough profitable opportunities that don’t depend upon starting a technology venture for entrepreneurs with the foresight and skill to pursue them.

Not Quite That Special

Here are a few final questions for you to consider:

  • When was the last time you heard a law firm say that the “LexisNexis” user interface isn’t what it should be, so it’s time to build our own legal database search engine?
  • Do you know of an accounting firm that is developing software because Oracle, Microsoft, Best, or SAP have nothing to offer and don’t understand the company’s unique business objectives?

Travel distribution has always been and remains a unique business but it’s essential to separate qualities that make business better from the costly specialization that it’s tempting to ask technology to make for us.

 

[i]     Alex Bainbridge, EUREKA! Where Could Your Travel Startup Ideas Come From?, (Tnooz, February 3, 2014).

[ii]    As many times as I’ve made that observation over the last 20 years, I’ve frequently been told what a shocking thing it is to say. I’ve almost never had anyone question whether or not it was true.

What Would A Proof of Open Booking Look Like?

One can spend considerable time and energy developing specific and detailed reviews of flawed theories and business proposals. Although appreciative comments and note are often the result, it’s important to recognize that this isn’t how business strategies should be developed.

The burden of proof rests with the proponents of new strategies and theories to use adequate and appropriate reasoning, and specific proofs to show that these are valid–not with everyone else to show why they are not.

Open Booking, as presently announced, is an ill-conceived business strategy that rests upon faulty logic, inadequate data, poor research, and a suspension of belief in how the real world operates. Its proponents have, or should have, certain obligations to correct these errors and show how Open Booking then remains a valid business premise.

Absent a much improved business case, the travel community is justified in rejecting Open Booking’s imaginary benefits without further argument. The disinclination of others to spend time refuting unsupported theories gives them no credence whatever.

Here’s a concise outline of how Open Booking must be proven. It’s not unrealistic and doesn’t assume more that a correct application of available evidence.

I’ve also attached a “conclusion” as to how likely we are to ever see any of these points addressed.

1)    Assume the Burden of Proof

Advocates of any theory, business or otherwise, carry the burden of proof which requires them to adequate demonstrate why their ideas are valid.

Statements about Open Booking such as “travelers are booking directly with suppliers and often times spending less money than if they go through a managed program,” or “there have been studies that have validated this but unfortunately, the status quo has swept them under the rug” are irrelevant commentary and establish nothing.
When you make such claims, it’s your job to substantiate them. Produce your evidence or abandon your claims.

Conclusion: The Burden of Proof is troublesome and inconvenient. It’s much more fun to make random, unsupported claims and suggest that people who disbelieve you should know better. The logical basis for Open Booking is so shaky that were unlikely to see a rush to defend it with more that opinion and speculation.

2)    Clearly and Comprehensively State the Proposition

Any business theory requires a detailed, comprehensive statement of what it is and how its proponents expect it to work. For Open Booking, that means more than the vague statements about how everyone is doing it so the result is therefore inevitable. The business proposition needs to be positively defended in order to be valid. Simply because flaws can be identified in the travel management process does nothing to advance the cause of Open Booking–there are other equally choices available.

The case for Open Booking also needs to consider business operations in the real world in detail and discuss how Open Booking affects each of them. A few short PowerPoint presentations do little to advance this discussion.

Conclusion: Building a correct business case is a lot of work, and Open Booking is a moving target that seems to evolve along a new line as soon as someone points out its shortcomings. It’s unlikely that anyone will expend the effort to improve this picture.

3)    Define Specific, Unambiguous Proofs That Your Assertions Are Correct

Once you’ve explained the business case for Open Booking, show us the clear proof-points that demonstrate the theory is valid and worth the effort. Not travelers are booking directly with suppliers and often times spending less money than if they go through a managed program” but how much, how often, under what conditions, and to what degree does this have to be so to offset costs and business risks?

Conclusion: If Open Booking could be substantiated in this way, someone would have tried to do so by now. The fact that proofs and evidence are abandoned in favor of opinion and anecdote is itself a demonstration of Open Booking’s failure.

4)    Use Objective, Comprehensive, Accurate, and Scientifically Correct Data

Forget self-selected surveys, tiny samples, biased questions, and the general lack of controls that infests almost all travel industry research. Produce data that can be defended, use it to establish your proofs, and then your Open Booking business proposition might have some validity.

Conclusion: Almost all travel research is useless and contrived to establish the preconceptions its authors want to perpetuate. This is unlikely to change anytime soon. As best (and this is conceding a great deal) the data in support of Open Booking are ambiguous.

Open Booking’s proofs and research should be straightforward and, if correct, should silence critics when accompanies by a comprehensive business proposition. It’s time this evidence is forthcoming.

5)    Comprehensively Describe How You Did Your Research

What precisely was your sampling methodology? How are your conclusions sustained by the raw data? What is an alternate interpretation of the data and how do you answer that interpretation? What would researchers have to do to replicate your research? Who sponsored your research and what are their and your predispositions?

Conclusion: Real research is transparent, fully explained and disclosed, and replicable. Spurious research sustains one-time conclusions or hides behind a proprietary cloak. This type of transparency and disclosure is very rare in the travel industry and non-existent as concerns Open Booking.

6)    State What You Cannot Yet Prove and How This Affects Your Conclusions

Scientific research acknowledges its shortcomings and identifies what cannot yet be proven as well as what can. It also admits areas where future evidence might disprove the theory. The quality of your interpretation of the evidence in support of your claims is as important as what that evidence specifically shows.

Open Booking lacks a real statement of its comprehensive business case, real proof-points that are offered to establish its validity, scientific evidence sufficient to establish the vague claims made in behalf of it, and a rational analysis of its very real deficiencies.

Conclusion: Open Booking’s proponents are no more likely to improve their process or develop their evidence in this area than they are in any other. Remember, if you are an advocate of Open Booking, you have the responsibility to develop and present your adequate evidence before anyone is obliged to give your ideas credence.

It’s not up to me or anyone else to disprove Open Booking–the burden rests with you. The six areas discussed here should be a minimum expectation.

Corporate Mobile Travel Strategy

This analysis appeared June 14, 2013 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section.


By now you’ve been thoroughly exposed to the idea that mobile applications (affectionately termed “apps”) are an essential part of travel technology. There’s no denying that mobile applications are popular, but understanding why and to what extent is more difficult.

Equally challenging is interpreting the specific implications for your business.

Business Case

Perhaps you’re as tired as I am of being told you “need” a mobile travel strategy, and it would be interesting to first understand what you could accomplish.

Proponents usually start building their case with surveys and research which suggest businesses without mobile capabilities risk being “overwhelmed” by competitors, as the number of people initiating travel transactions on mobile devices expands to eclipse all other methods.

This argument runs aground somewhat because almost all this research isn’t very good. Briefly, almost all popular industry researchers don’t disclose their financial backers and biases, or their research methods, and their products aren’t scientifically designed or operated.

We’re left to conclude that, from among the hundreds of millions of smartphones and tablets, consumers simply must be looking for travel products, even if specific numbers can’t be verified.

Competition among the literally millions of app developers is intense–for room on the device and consumer attention if nothing else. Of the dozens of apps on your device, how many do you really use?

Five or six is an oft-quoted number.

I’m not arguing against mobility or applications, just pointing out that the barriers to successful entry are significant, and assuming these are unimportant because the market must be huge doesn’t make it so, or drive travelers to use a mobile app simply because you offer it.

In the simplest terms, people probably use mobile applications for some of the following reasons:

  • Having a computer with you everywhere you go is certainly handy.
  • Most people didn’t do that much with their PCs anyway–the transition to mobile is fairly straightforward.
  • The apps can look and behave better than on a PC, because building tools in a web browser was never a really great idea.
  • Most travel vendors have made communicating with them so difficult and unpleasant that the simplest, handiest form of electronic access looks very attractive.

As you start thinking about a mobile strategy, consider carefully the real reasons you believe travelers will support it.

The Best Tool Is the One That Works

Corporate travel buyers are often presented a surprisingly sparse list of mobile application choices. Much of what is on offer doesn’t do much or work very well.

Consumers have always had a high tolerance for flawed travel technology–a frequent reaction being that, if it works at all, it works wonderfully. The basis for a successful mobile strategy might be to insist on delivering real value and performance to the customer.

Determine what the service and business needs of your travelers are, then look for products that can approximate those requirements with an acceptable level of change to your operation.

For example, if you’ve determined that travelers should be able to request, change, and reconcile their trips from a mobile device, be certain that the tools you select allow that to happen with very few failures, limited training, modest traveler effort, and acceptable recourse when things go wrong.

These sound like “everybody does that” goals, but in practice they are difficult. Don’t be coaxed into accepting marginal products simply because they’re mobile.

It appropriate to set more modest goals that support your overall service strategy and that you can successfully reach.

The Best Tool Is No Tool

The travel industry is often anxious to build solutions to problems that shouldn’t be solved. No tool, mobile or otherwise, can change the fact that most “technology problems” are really unresolved management problems.

Often your business goals are better supported by altering procedures and requirements to make problems go away, as opposed to looking for the latest apps that might solve them.

The distance between mobile applications and other computer-based tools isn’t very great, and no computer ever compensated for poor procedures and policies, unrealistic expectations, traveler misbehavior, or a failure to manage.

Mobility is best viewed not as the centerpiece, but rather as an intelligent and convenient enabler for your comprehensive product, service, and travel strategy.

 

IATA’s New Distribution Capability (NDC)

This analysis appeared July 15, 2013 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section.


In an industry as diverse as travel distribution, there is rarely a shortage of controversial ideas. Recently, critical voices have been raised against IATA’s “New Distribution Capability” (NDC) initiative, variously asserting that its development was closed to most outside input, that it is unfair to travel agents, technology providers, and other stakeholders. It is claimed that the NDC harms consumer interests, and that its implementation requires unacceptable privacy compromises and financial expenditures from distributors and consumers alike.

Curiously, I’ve yet to hear the simplest and most concise justification for opposing the NDC from anyone:

It’s a fundamentally bad idea that probably won’t work.

As these posts must necessarily be brief, I’ll only touch on a few of the NDC’s strategic and business flaws–operational and technological shortcomings must await another discussion.

What Is the NDC?

According to IATA1 the NDC is a business and technological initiative best understood as a process that allows “indirect channels” to enable the same capabilities that exist on airline websites, while preserving an airline’s control of the product. It also proposes to enable product innovation, differentiation, and personalization by directly accessing expanded information as to a traveler’s purchasing profile and history.

The NDC’s “initial scope is the shopping process.” As an example of how this might work, supporters maintain that the NDC will modernize air travel distribution and benefitconsumers by giving them an experience similar to Amazon.

Perhaps, but the NDC mistakenly confuses multiple goals in a package that delivers capabilities few people want. It’s technical features represent one way, certainly not the only or necessarily the best, to enhance shopping data. Other intended benefits are more dubious.

Amazon is a poor service delivery model–air travel distribution has little to do with selling books or consumer products.

The personalized shopping experience, whether through Amazon or an airline, is largely a chimera without real-world application. Frequent Amazon shoppers are aware of the annoying and usually irrelevant suggestions the site continually offers–transferring this unhelpful dialogue to benefit air travel strains the imagination.

One Bad Idea Begets Another

IATA is criticized for failing to adequately consult with distributors and consumers as the NDC was developed–perhaps justly so, although interpretations disagree as to how meaningful the prior industry dialogue was. It’s worth noting that however worthwhile these discussions might have been, IATA isn’t obliged to hold them in any particular way, or to do so at all.

There is also a serious question as to who might participate. There are no industry-wide trade associations with adequate technology capabilities, credibility, and resources to represent even segments of distributors or consumers. Individual companies may have meaningful input, but are not in a position to speak for anyone else, or even their own customers.

Industry discussions to develop and refine technology policy are exceedingly rare–much more so that IATA’s critics would have us believe. Those who feel excluded would do well to upgrade the forums, expertise, and messages they might use to make meaningful future contributions.

Who Benefits?

Shouldn’t airlines know more about the consumer prior to booking so they can “personalize” the product offering, as the NDC promises?

If that were so, it should be easy to describe what that “personalization” would look like–but it isn’t. Beyond the vague “more like Amazon” promise, “personalization” sounds like a more technologically advanced bundling of the many obscure fees and charges no one likes or wants.

If the result isn’t higher consumer costs, what is it?

Many airlines have had access to personal data that were supposed to enable better offerings for decades (through frequent flyer programs, for example). The fact that these enhancements have been meager causes consumers to rightly question whether the new expense and privacy compromises the NDC imposes are justified.

The New Distribution Capability proposes to solve problems most consumers don’t see as problems and deliver ill-defined benefits they haven’t asked for and probably won’t appreciate–at an undetermined cost they are unlikely to embrace. Wholly apart from the clumsy way it has been developed and presented, this is not a formula for a successful project.

IATA was ill-advised to start down this path and its airline participants are likely to see more customer grievances, direct and indirect program costs, and few of the NDC’s promised benefits.

  1. International Air Transportation Association (IATA), NDC Update, November 2012, page 8.

Five Important Technology Projects You Should Watch

This analysis appeared May 17, 2013 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section.


However risky, making technology predictions is a popular and occasionally enlightening pastime. I’ve found it helpful to have a “watch list” of projects and products that might be influential or require some business strategy adjustment.

Here is my current travel industry-related list, in no particular priority. I’ve indicated why I believe each is important and what the effects might be. Some obvious choices such as IATA’s NDC initiative are omitted as they are the subject of future posts.

The Signal and the Noise

The title of a 2012 book by Nate Silver on statistical predictions and why they fail, this term refers to the fundamental engineering and scientific concept that, in order to perform any sort of reasonable analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between what is to be measured (the signal) and background noise.

In travel technology, it is frequently helpful to make similar differentiations to distinguish between what is truly important and what simply sounds important. There are innumerable noise-makers throughout the industry telling their own versions of what deserves our attention.

Three important tests you might use to validate such assertions are:

  • Why is this really important to more than a few people?
  • What is the time frame over which it might become important?
  • What special conditions might have to exist to make it important?
  1. Computing Platforms and MobilityWhile it’s true that consumer attitudes toward smart phones, tablets, laptops, and desktops are evolving, no one knows specifically how. People replace laptops with tablets partly because they enjoy their added mobility, but also because it isn’t a great sacrifice as most didn’t do much with their laptops anyway.
    It doesn’t mean that laptops and desktops are going away (there are things you simply can’t do on a tablet) but the consumer mix will certainly change.
    Experts have been predicting that mobile computing will revolutionize travel purchasing for so long that it eventually might happen–once the public can get past the fact that most mobile travel applications don’t do much.

    2.  ETS2

    The U.S. Federal Government’s new on-line travel procurement system, ETS2 is perhaps the least understood, most under-reported, and most confusing travel technology project to have taken place for decades. It directly effects thousands of people but is concentrated on those involved with government travel. Indirectly its influence on procurement practice and to some extent on technology design will be widespread and enduring.

    The travel trade press (on-line and print) earns an “F” for almost ignoring ETS2 over the past four years and for producing not a single insightful analysis of why the project evolved the way it did and what it means for the industry.

    3.  On-line Travel Agencies and Supplier Direct Sales

    Recently, by some measures, on-line sales to travel suppliers surpassed sales through online agencies. This is significant because the desire of travel vendors to deal directly with “their customers” is deeply felt and has been pursued by many suppliers for longer than The Internet has existed–it won’t be abating anytime soon.

    In a free market, people find ways to get at what they want. It would seem that more want what they perceive vendors can give them directly on-line than they can get on-line through intermediaries.

    4.  Social Media

    Sometimes people get the idea that whenever the Thor’s Hammer of Social Media is produced they must automatically lend their full attention and, should they choose to participate in the business schemes described, they are entitled to sit in some electronic Valhalla feasting on e-dollars with the gods.

    The reference to Norse mythology is not as far-fetched as it sounds: most Social Media projects are on similarly imaginative ground.

    Social Media are significant but, as with other electronic tools, you have to have real service-oriented products and something compelling to say.

    Beware those who tell you otherwise and look for projects that will enhance real business goals and deliver truly superior customer service.

    5.  Microsoft

    Pay attention to what Microsoft is doing, as it tries to keep pace with the direction its planners perceive the industry to be heading.

    Presently, this involves significantly changed consumer software licensing and delivery, changes to user interfaces and product design that most people didn’t ask for, and assumptions that you and I want the same “experience” on a tablet that we do on a desktop or a phone–I don’t; perhaps you do.

    The company’s size and scope mean that we can’t avoid its good and bad decisions, many of which can have expensive consequences.

Rethinking Data

This analysis appeared April 30, 2013 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section


Data and their application have been a travel industry fixation since ADS was discovered over 30 years ago. When it became practical to collect the specifics of what travel customers were buying, suddenly it was an essential management task, effective competition hinged on being the best data manipulator, and travel managers were left to wonder what they should do with the piles of reports TMCs were cheerfully offering.

Most people are still wondering. Making better decisions that are enabled by travel data is a goal industry experts, acknowledge, respect, desire to achieve, and find surprisingly elusive.

A correct and productive data strategy for the travel industry is not difficult to identify, but its successful implementation requires discarding several cherished ideas.

Big Data…Big Deal

Some years ago, the CEO of a major national TMC (herein nameless) was fond of telling industry groups that it once “came to me in a flash of light that I was really in the information business.”

As I worked for a major competitor, I was also fond of telling the same story–with full attribution to its author. I added that perhaps his next corporate account proposal would be successful if he offered just reports…and no tickets.

Travel is not an information business; it is a service business and many of the most indefensible and irrational travel products were conceived when people lost sight of that fact. Where data support the delivery of effective and affordable customer service, analysis has a role.

Analysis for its own sake has few uses and is something for which most travel managers have a difficult time writing a check.

The current hot topic in reporting circles is “big data,” (ten years ago it was “data warehousing”). Apart from the fact that big data means lots of data from multiple sources, most people are challenged to explain its business rationale.

Under most conditions, “big data” is a term without meaning in the travel industry. Effective managers in all sectors of the industry need realistic business analysis goals, without regard to the size or complexity of a data set. Collecting the most data sounds highly scientific to most people and from that they incorrectly infer that the exercise must be valuable and that ill-defined real-world applications are justified.

Big data might have a role in such predictions as what travelers will buy, but even there the variables are so complex as to confound all but the most determined and expert analysts.

Where’s Your Talent?

Decision support tools for the travel industry have proven difficult to build and maintain, and the few companies that produce truly good ones are highly underrated for the value they deliver. A successful decision support tool enables better, more informed business decisions that cannot necessarily be anticipated when the system and the databases that sustain it are conceived.

As essential to such a system’s success as the skill with which it was designed is the insight it enables for its human operator. Systems people are prone to highlight data, reports, and analysis while overlooking the fact that a skillful, insightful, talented operator is what moves decision support into action.

The system’s role is to make that talent productive.

Without recognizing the role and composition of decision support, travel data analysts are likely to dive down any number of rabbit holes looking for new projects. One good example is the current fascination with data analysis projects that have subjective outcomes.

Systems that contrive to use data for calculating such things as traveler dissatisfaction with policy are ill-conceived in my view. A “dissatisfaction” report cannot escape the subjective and occasionally irrational nature of what it attempt to measure, a problem which is compounded by dozens of other variables that combine to make the result about as meaningless as arguing that green is better than blue.

Successful corporate travel data analysis is built upon clear business goals, and supported by decision support tools that empower insight and better conclusions in their human users.

They recognize the elegance found in simplicity and employ the shortest, most efficient way to deliver their results, and the travel managers using them do well to require specific answers from them to their real-world problems.

Perspectives on Data Ownership: 2013

This analysis appeared March 15, 2013 in Cornerstone Information System’s “Insight & Opinion” section.


Recent popular discussions of “big data” (a surprisingly ill-defined term) are curiously silent on where these data may come from and who should decide where and how they are used. Perhaps this is because the current social media wave encourages individuals and businesses to surrender a degree of privacy (and hence control over data) in return for the promised benefits of whatever service is on offer.

While we may believe that travel data ownership questions were settled long ago, control and ownership questions are more complex than many assume and require careful review regardless of how open or restrictive data access should be.

Everyone’s In Charge

Most travel businesses you speak with will assert either that passenger travel data belong to them or that they have a right to use and distribute them essentially as they see fit.

Corporate travel managers usually maintain that, since they pay the bills, they both own and control the data. Airlines and other vendors often assume the right to use and distribute data about the use of their services, and travel management companies believe they have a degree of ownership because much of the most valuable travel data comes from their systems and exists because they expended energy to create it on behalf of “their customers.”

This travel data ownership conflict is a familiar story, but there are other less evident or considered levels:

A number of processing intermediaries including payment systems, ticket processors, GDS companies, and on-line booking tools assert a right to distribute travel data and reports for their financial benefit, apart from any direct or indirect benefit travel buyers receive. Typically this is done with individual travelers remaining anonymous, but the degree to which “anonymous” travel detail is widely available, down to specific itineraries and dates, would surprise most travel managers.

Many sources also make data available to third-party aggregators, who also operate for their own financial benefit under the assumed anonymity of individual travelers. Such companies produce an array of usage and comparative models, predictions, and similar data projects which find uses far removed from travel management.

Assumed Anonymity

I use this term to describe the broad assumption that, if my name isn’t present, whatever follows doesn’t matter. Anonymity can unravel quickly. It’s hard to argue that the kind of industry-wide data aggregations used by the DOT and others to predict economic trends are threatening, but under the care of a skilled analyst, extensive company-specific and individual travel patterns could be deduced, especially by combining multiple sources.

Interesting Questions

The extent and depth of travel data distribution and usage should at least cause travel managers some reflection, even if they decide they need not be concerned.
Here are a few specific thoughts:

  1.  complete chain of custody affecting anyone’s travel data is unknown–sometimes adequate, elsewhere non-existent. Many companies with data responsibilities have no real data security program in place that runs deeper that simply saying the right things.
  2. How is it that so many travel industry business intermediaries are selling data produced by customer activities for their own benefit? Aggregate industry analytical reports are one thing–distributing detailed raw data to third parties is another. Where did that permission come from?
  3. Have corporate travel managers looked at the type of data being distributed about their travelers in detail and rationalized it with their own company privacy and security practices?
  4. Are travel management companies comfortable with the extent of peer comparison by vendors and subsequent data aggregation that has become commonplace in the industry?